Transportation Research Board 96th Annual Meeting 8/01/17 → 12/01/17
INTRODUCTION 1
Lane changes on high way are essential to traffic operations. Systematic lane changes can lead to 2 a significant capacity drop (1) , and are proved to be the primary reason of density oscillations 3 and traffic instabilities (2, 3) . Besides, a considerable amount of collisions are also generated by 4 lane changes (4) . On the contrary, controlling lane changes of equipped vehicles can absorb 5 congestions (5)and mitigate traffic oscillations (6). 6 Moreover, intelligent transport systems (ITSs) have been widely investigated and used to 7 improve drivers' safety and comfort, as well as to improve the traffic efficiency and emission. In 8 addition, ITSs in vehicles are constantly being developed and usually referred to as advanced 9 driver assistance systems (ADASs). Benefitting from the development of accurate positioning 10 (e.g., via point precise positioning (7)), as well as vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure 11 communication technologies (8) , a more advanced in-car system is envisioned, which can give 12 instructions to drivers down to the lane level. 13 As a first step towards in-car algorithms for lane-change advice, a fundamental approach 14 on controlling lane changes is proposed in this paper. The proposed algorithm cannot be 15 implemented in-car, but shows what the effect of lane changes could be on traffic flow, and how 16 optimization of lane change can improve the traffic flow. In addition, three different objectives 17 are targeted respectively, they are: collective optimum, group optimum, and user optimum. By 18 comparing the optimization results produced by following these objectives, general rules on 19 good lane-change moments are extracted. 20 The remainder of paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents a literature overview 21 of lane-change impacts and vehicle controls on lane change. In section 3, a problem formulation 22 is presented, in which those three control objectives are elaborated. The next section describes 23 the optimization algorithm implemented in this paper; a design of optimization process for 24 reaching the user optimum is also elaborated in this section. Next, the settings in simulation and 25 the development of a case study is introduced in section 5. In section 6, optimization results of 26 the developed case under three objectives are presented and analyzed. The final section 27 summarizes the findings and conclusions of this paper, it furthermore discusses a potential 28 implementation of the results, and further research directions. 29 for all the longitudinal movements in this paper. In addition, vehicles will not change their lane, 18 unless they are under control, and are suggested to do so. 19 In this section, controlled variables are optimized by forming various objectives, and they 20 are all formulized as the minimization of the total travel delay. Three objectives are formed, the 21 first two objectives are under the assumption that cooperation will exist in the control process, 22 while in the third objective, vehicles will not cooperate. These objectives are: 23
LITERATURE OVERVIEW
• Cooperative objective: 24
(1) Collective optimum 25 (2) Group optimum 26
• Non-cooperative objective: 27
(1) User optimum 28
The cooperative objectives are found by the collective and the group optimization, while the user 29 optimum is found within the framework of game theory. TABLE 1 provides an overview of the 30 symbols used in this paper. 31
3.1.Cooperation objective 32
For the cooperative objective, we assume that controlled vehicles will cooperate and compromise 33 in order to increase the collective or the group benefit. Accordingly, we form two objectives: one 34 is the collective optimum and the other is the group optimum. 35 
Collective optimum 3
For the first objective, the overall traffic state is supposed to be facilitated by lane changes of 4 controlled vehicles. The total travel delay of all vehicles is used to evaluate the traffic state in 5 this paper. Therefore, the optimized lane-change time instants of all the controlled vehicles are 6 formulated as:
To be clarified, NC A is the action set of controlled vehicles, which contains their lane-change 10 time instants, namely ,
. Note that in this definition, the action of each vehicle 11 consists of two elements, which are the moment of changing lane and the moment of changing 12 back, for instance: 1
By equation (1), all vehicles driving on the road stretch will benefit from their lane 14 changes, and the controlled vehicles will cooperate to each other to achieve the objective. 15
Group optimum 16
For the group optimum, the controlled vehicles will cooperate in order to optimize the total travel 17 delay among this controlled group. Analogously, the optimized lane-change time instants of 18 controlled vehicles are formulated as: The free flow speed of vehicle i
3.2.Non-cooperative objective 1
Alternatively, we can assume that drivers will not cooperate, but compete to each other for the 2 best travel time. It is conceivable that the optimal solution for these competitions will be an 3 action equilibrium among controlled vehicles, in which "nobody can benefit from changing his 4 action individually", similar to a Nash equilibrium (20) . As the controlled vehicles are supposed 5 to anticipate in each other's lane changes, we formulate the optimization under the framework of 6 game theory. 7
Game definition 8
In this case, the process of finding the optimal lane changes is considered as a game. 9 Accordingly, a multi-player, completed information and static game is formed, meaning that all 10 the players are aware of the complete information set and make their decision simultaneously. 11
Hereby, the game between controlled vehicles is defined as: (20) 12 G= , , u NC A (3) 13 Symbols will also be rephrased in game theoretical framework: 14
• NC denotes the players, which are controlled vehicles in this case, it is a finite set of n 15 and indexed by i,
• A is an action profile, 
Optimization formulation 22
A game in the normal form is described in this objective, based on the nature of game that we 23 designed previously, all players will decide their actions simultaneously and optimize their 24 individual total travel delays. The action profile of this multi-player game is formulated as: 25
...
26
This optimization process will find an action set * i a , and lead to an equilibrium, in which: 27
Where i a − denotes the action sets taken by other players. The inequality (5) indicates that in the 1 equilibrium, "nobody can profitably deviate from their actions" (20) , so that their actions depend 2 on each other. Therefore, one of the approximate pure Nash equilibrium is reached in this 3 situation, and it is considered as the individual optimum in this paper. 4
OPTIMIZATION 5
This section describes the optimization algorithm. First, section 4.1 describes the genetic 6 algorithm used for optimizing the group and collective optimum, and section 4.2 describes how 7 the optimum is found for the individual optimum. Readers interested in the result, can move on 8 to section 5. 9
Heuristic algorithm 10
Three non-linear integer optimization problems are formed in section 3, we choose a genetic 11 algorithm (GA) to solve them due to the complexity of problems. In the algorithm, individuals 12 are evolved towards a better performance of one certain optimization, and iterations of the 13 evolution are denoted as generations. The evolution follows the process of encoding, 14 initialization, crossover, selection and mutation; hereby, the last three steps are iterated until 15 reaching the stop criteria. These steps are elaborated as follows: 
Individual before mutation
Individual after mutation 
4 Where ( , ) TTD indi g indicates the total travel delay derived from individual indi in 5 generation g, and max ( ) TTD g indicates the maximum value of all total travel delays 6 derived from individuals in generation g. From equation (7), the individual which can 7 derive a shorter total travel delay will have a higher value of fitness function; in addition, 8 the lowest value of fitness function is 1. Hence, the selected probability of individual indi 9 is formulated as: 10
11
Where Pop indicates the population that includes all the individuals in a generation. By 12 equation (8), the selection probability of each individual is proportional to its fitness 13 function. By implementing this method, the child with a better fitness value has a higher 14 probability to be selected, meanwhile the child with a lower fitness value will not be 15 eliminated completely. 16 (5) Mutation: firstly, a mutation position will be randomly chosen. After this position for a 17 possible mutation has been selected, it is chosen whether the values at this position will 18 change (probability 0.1) or not (probability 0.9). A demonstration of mutation is shown in 19 FIGURE 2(b). 20 (6) Stop criteria: the iteration will stop if: (1) the maximum iteration threshold is reached, or 1 (2) both the average objective value and the best objective value stop improving. 2
The first criterion guarantees this optimization algorithm will operate within a 3 reasonable computational time; while the second criterion indicates a relatively optimal 4 individual is selected and this optimal individual is within an optimal generation. 5
Optimization process for individual optimum 6
Except for the optimization algorithm, an optimization process is designed to find the 7 approximate Nash equilibrium in the individual optimum, by the equation: 8
TTD a a a a a
9
Where k i a denotes the action set of vehicle i in iteration k and k i TTD denotes the total travel 10 delay of vehicle i in iteration k. In the process, k is iterated from 1 to the final iteration K, in 11 which all the optimized action sets stop changing significantly; while in each iteration, i is 12 iterated from 1 to the total number of controlled vehicles n. As an initialized value, 0 i a is 13 generated randomly in section 4.1. The equation means that in the k th iteration, we find the 14 optimum for vehicle i by assuming the actions from k th iteration for vehicle 1 to vehicle i-1, and 15 the actions from the k-1 th iteration for vehicles with an index higher than i. 16 By the process, the actions of all the controlled vehicles will converge to a preferred 17 profile, from which nobody will profit by deviating; as a result, the optimized results can be 18 considered as a pure Nash equilibrium. 19
SIMULATION SETTINGS 20
In this paper, lane change is considered at a conceptual level, namely they are simplified in 21 several aspects: 22
• Vehicles are point particles, so they cannot collide when changing lanes. 23
• Vehicles do not change lanes, unless they are instructed to do so by the algorithm in 24 section 3. 25
• Lane-change actions are considered as an instantaneous movement. 26
The optimization algorithm is tested in a microsimulation. In the simulation, the two-lane 27 straight road stretch, without any on-ramp and off-ramp, is developed, which has a pre-defined 28 critical density of 25veh/km/lane. 120 vehicles are generated and evenly distributed on each 29 lane, the free flow speed of each vehicle is assigned randomly under the restriction of speed limit 30 in each lane (80-100 km/h in the slow lane and 100-130 km/h in the fast lane 
21
Mentioned by Papageorgiou et al., the total delay can be derived from the travel times (23). 22 Since the end time of the simulation is fixed, while the end location of each vehicle is influenced 23 by the controller, we will work with the distance covered. In this case, the total delay and the 24 travel times can convert to each other, since the speed is constant. • The average accepted merging gaps for controlled vehicles. It shows how much the 11 controlled vehicles are willing to disturb the traffic state. 12
• The average number of vehicles that have been overtaken by controlled vehicles. It shows 13 how much users' benefit the controlled vehicles are able to achieve. In the collective optimum, the total travel delay of all vehicles is optimized and the 24 trajectories are shown in FIGURE 5(a For the group optimum, the trajectories are shown in FIGURE 5(b). Analogously, it can 1 be observed that when the controlled vehicles perform their lane changes, finding proper gaps is 2 also prior to overtaking the bottleneck by this optimum. 3 However, compared to the collective optimum, more controlled vehicles are able to 4 overtake the congested section by changing lanes in the group optimum. Moreover, the average 5 travel duration on the slow lane is shorter (21 seconds) and the average merging gap is smaller 6 (110 meters) in this optimum. These results can be predicted from the different considerations on 7
proper gaps in the collective and the group optimum: in the group optimum, the controlled 8 vehicles compromise to each other rather than compromising to uncontrolled vehicles to 9 maximize their group benefit; however, other vehicles may suffer from their actions. In addition, 10 this argument is strengthened by a lager average delay of vehicles on the slow lane (151 seconds) 11 and a bigger number of overtaken vehicles (7.4 in average) in this optimum. 12 The trajectories in the user optimum is depicted in FIGURE 5(c) Generally speaking, the more the controlled vehicles consider only their own benefit, the 26 less they will cooperate with others. Hence, they will merge in a smaller gap and drive on the 27 slow lane for a shorter duration. Consequently, the traffic state of the slow lane will be disturbed 28 more and controlled vehicles will be able to overtake more vehicles. 29
In short, values of objective functions in the collective optimum, the group optimum and 30 the user optimum are included in 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 2
This paper investigates the influence of objectives on lane-change optimization. Three 3 optimization problems are formulated based on three objectives, which are: the collective 4 optimum, the group optimum and the individual optimum. These optimizations are solved by 5 employing a genetic algorithm (using game theory for the individual optimum). 6 The different results indicate that the controlled lane-change actions can differ for 7 objectives of different groups. In addition, optima with less cooperation will introduce more 8 disturbance in the traffic state, have a lower requirement in merging gaps, travel a shorter 9 distance on the slow lane and have more overtaken vehicles. 10 Generally speaking, equipped vehicles controlled by the objective of collective and group 11 optima will be suggested to launch the lane change when a larger gap is available, as well as to 12 drive on the slow lane for a longer time. On the contrary, by the individual optimum, vehicles 13 will be suggested to change to the slow lane when the congestion is encountered, and to change 14 back when it has overtaken the bottleneck. 15 One limiting factor in this work is the simple simulated network, with a simplified car 16 following model; additionally, the global optimum cannot be guaranteed by employing genetic 17 algorithm (GA). Furthermore, in the user optimum, the action equilibrium can only be 18 approximately found by implementing the optimization process, and the optimization sequence 19 in the process can influence the final results. Besides, the benefits of the overall traffic state and 20 each controlled vehicle could be influenced by the initial location of the controlled vehicles. In 21 addition, the sequence of controlled vehicles could also influence their individual benefits in 22 each optimum. These relationships should be further investigated. 23 Nonetheless, a structure of formulating lane-change control problems is developed, and 24 this structure can be consistently implemented in a more effective control system. Without 25 calculations in optimization algorithm, this system will instruct vehicles to change lane during a 26 bigger gap and drive on the slow lane as long as possible to improve the collective or the group 27 traffic efficiency. On the contrary, controlled vehicles will be instructed to overtake as many 28 vehicles as they can to maximize their own benefit. 29
As a theoretical overview of the lane-change optimal control is given, the proposed 30 algorithm can be further extended and implemented in intelligent driving systems, such as in-car 31 advice system, more precise and advanced navigation systems and traffic control systems. The 1 next step is to convert the results found by the full optimization in this paper into simple 2 algorithms implementable in vehicles, by which the computational consumption will be 3 drastically reduced, and the algorithm will have a wide prospect in the development of real time 4 advice or intelligent driving systems. 5 For researches in the future, the estimation on lane specific traffic state will be embedded 6 into the optimization, and effort will be put on reducing computational consumption. Moreover, 7
to be more practical, predictive models on lane-change behavior and lane specific traffic state 8 will also be embedded. 9
